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Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to understand why and how the European External Action 
Service (EEAS) has developed a specific approach towards religion, an approach 
characterised by the focus on freedom of religion and belief (FoRB). The research 
question is to assess the level of autonomy and distinctiveness of religion as a policy 
issue. The European diplomatic strategy on religion reflects geopolitical and societal 
changes at the global scale. It is also an effort of the EEAS to assert itself as a political 
player and to reinforce the profile of the European Union (EU) in international relations. 
In practice, the handling of religion is framed by the usual EU policy-making: ideational 
incentives (advocacy for FoRB, display of European unity and identity) matter but are 
secondary to realist ones (interests and security concerns); the risk-averse culture of 
diplomats and European bureaucracies leads them to defer to the states and to 
prioritise a legal approach to religion. This paper draws on academic and institutional 
literature; the analysis of the adoption and implementation of the 2013 EU Guidelines 
on the Promotion and Protection of Freedom of Religion or Belief; an online survey of 
EU Delegations around the world; and interviews with national and European officials. 
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Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to understand why and how the European External Action 
Service (EEAS) has developed a specific approach towards religion, an approach 
characterised by the focus on freedom of religion and belief (FoRB). The research 
question is to assess the level of autonomy and distinctiveness of religion as a policy 
issue in this context. A first hypothesis is that the European diplomatic strategy on 
religion is part and parcel of a wider re-enhancement of faith matter due to 
geopolitical and societal changes at the global scale. A second hypothesis is that the 
rise of the EEAS as a political player on religious issues is driven by power games, both 
to assert itself regarding other institutions of the European Union (EU) and to reinforce 
the profile of the EU in international relations. A third and last hypothesis is that the 
handling of religion is framed by the usual EU policy-making: ideational incentives 
(advocacy for FoRB, display of European unity and identity) matter but are secondary 
to realist ones (interests and security concerns); the risk-averse culture of diplomats 
and European bureaucracies leads them to defer to the states and to prioritise a legal 
approach to religion.   
 
Religion has become more and more an issue in international politics in the last four 
decades. Most frequently, it comes to the fore in a traumatic mode through its 
association with violence. Meanwhile, it is also considered as a possible resource to 
solve conflicts, bridge gaps between cultures or expand influence. This renewed 
salience of religion has led to considerations on whether political and intellectual 
debates should be reframed to acknowledge the changing interactions between 
politics, religion and modernity. As one of the most secularised parts of the world, 
Europe has been particularly subjected to such considerations. As a multi-cultural and 
multi-leveled polity with different traditions with regard to the sacred, and as a highly 
rationalised and realist political system, the European Union is bound to struggle to 
come to terms with this new state of play. 
 
Freedom of religion and belief is the dominant repertoire of action in the 
contemporary political handling of religion under the aegis of human rights. The 
strategy to advocate FoRB developed by the EEAS illustrates how the EU is dealing with 
religious issues in its relations with the rest of the world. This paper does not aim to 
present an account of the academic debate on the re-articulation between secular 
and spiritual affairs in European politics and to document the mutations of faith and 
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secularism.1 It rather analyses a case study on how the policy framework for European 
diplomats to advocate ForB in third countries has been adopted and implemented. 
The paper draws on several sources and methods: The analysis of the EU Guidelines 
on the Promotion and Protection of Freedom of Religion or Belief (EUFoRB)2 provides a 
practical example of the operationalisation of religion as a diplomatic object. A survey 
of how EU Delegations deal with religion in general and EUFoRB in particular was 
carried out in 2015 through an online questionnaire. Face-to-face interviews were 
conducted between 2013 and 2016 with European and national diplomats, civil 
servants and Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) as well as diplomats from 
third countries and representatives of civil society (see Annex for more details). 
Relevant official and non-official institutional literature was also consulted. 
 
Two scenarios could explain why the EEAS has put religion on its agenda. A first 
scenario can be a mere acknowledgement of its significance as a parameter of 
external affairs. A second scenario, in a more normative version, is an advocacy for its 
positive contribution to world governance, the common good and the promotion of 
European values and interests. Both scenarios have a part of truth. The EEAS has 
elaborated a strategy on religion partly because of the necessity to deal with an issue 
that has become more prominent in international relations, and partly because of the 
opportunity to reinforce itself as a bureaucracy and the EU as a global actor. However, 
this European strategy remains timid in its value-based dimension and takes already 
well established venues at national and international levels to deal with religion. 
  
Shifting to practices on the ground, the last part of the paper focuses on the action of 
the EEAS to advocate religious freedom. Two key features can be highlighted: the 
centrality of states’ models and interests (both member states and third states); the 
preference for law as repertoire of action but the resurgence of politics on the field. 
 
First, there is a strong continuity between national and supranational practices. The 
EEAS chiefly duplicates and hybridises the modes of action of the member states. For 
European diplomats posted in third countries, local states are the main interlocutors 
                                                 
1 Foret, François, Religion and Politics in the European Union: The Secular Canopy, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2015. 
2 Council of the European Union. ‘EU Guidelines on the Promotion and Protection of Freedom 
of Religion or Belief’, https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/137585.pdf (accessed 12 May 
2017). 
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and direct interactions with civil society are managed with caution in order not to 
antagonise public authorities. Subsequently, the universalism of the principles 
underlying FoRB is challenged both by their divergent interpretations rooted in national 
cultures and interests within the EU; and by their adaptation to the country where 
every EU Delegation is operating.  
 
Second, law is the main repertoire of action to handle religious issues and there is a 
propensity to reframe any religious dimension as a problem of religious freedom. This is 
a way to circumscribe a potentially controversial matter to the safe and consensual 
prism of human rights. However, politics is prompt to re-emerge, especially because 
internal and external European affairs overlap constantly.  
 
The paper is structured as follows: the next section offers a quick reminder of the 
reasons and modalities of the ‘comeback’ of religion in international relations. The rise 
of the EEAS as a policy player on religion and religious freedom is then explained 
against this general background. Finally, the analysis of the action of European 
diplomats on the field shows the gaps between policy doctrine and practice and the 
competing values and interests at work. 
 
The ‘new clothes’ of religion in International Relations 
The modern state is not the outcome of a radical secularisation process, understood 
as a caesura from religion, but of the incorporation of religion into politics.3 What is true 
in domestic politics also holds true for international relations. The ‘restorative narrative’ 
that has replaced the secularisation thesis as the main frame of religion in International 
Relations needs to be revised, as religion has never left according to Shackman Hurd:  
Rather than bringing religion ‘back in’ to an allegedly secularised international 
public sphere, religion is not and never was entirely outside of power, in search 
of an opportunity to be publically resuscitated. To the contrary, religion is often 
wielded most powerfully by those in power, including states, market forces, 
institutionalised religions, international organisations, and others.4  
                                                 
3 Mavelli, Luca, “Security and secularization in International Relations”, European Journal of 
International Relations, vol. 18, no. 1, 2011, pp. 177-199; Gorski, Philip, “Historicizing the 
secularization debate: Church, state and society in late medieval and early modern Europe, 
ca. 1300 to 1700”, American Sociological Review, vol. 65, no. 1, 2000, pp. 138-167. 
4 Shakman Hurd, Elizabeth, “International politics after secularism”, Review of International 
Studies, vol. 38, no. 5, 2012, pp. 944-946. 
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What is new is thus not the movement of religion in and out of foreign affairs but what 
is done to define and use it in political discourses and practices. If there is a change, 
it is indeed in the ‘strategic operationalisation of religion’ by the states. Before 9/11, 
states were assumed to deal with religion internally, or not at all. After 9/11, religion has 
visibly been re-established on the diplomatic agenda in two cases: when dangerous 
forms of religion escape the control of one country and are considered to be in need 
of international disciplining by coalitions of states; and when religion can be mobilised 
to promote the common public international good (humanitarian and development 
projects, human rights campaigns, transitional justice efforts, and so on).5  
 
The nature of the strategic change is twofold: it concerns the internationalisation of 
religion, and the dichotomisation between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ religion. The new motto 
of foreign policy is to empower peaceful religion and to marginalise dangerous 
religion. Still following Shackman Hurd, actors such as the United States (US), the United 
Nations (UN) or the EU have played a key role in this process.6 The dominant repertoire 
of action is law, and religious freedom tends to become the matrix to deal with 
religion. However, law and religious freedom are not neutral vis-à-vis religion as they 
privilege some religious forms over others (practices over beliefs for example) and 
subsequently some denominations over others (especially those with a clear hierarchy 
and institutional spokespersons able to voice their claims in the political arena).7 
 
The debate on freedom of religion and belief is a good synthesis of the larger one on 
religion in international relations in terms of novelty vs. continuity; universalism vs. 
cultural singularity; state as solution vs. state as problem; power games vs. ideational 
incentives; internal vs. external affairs; and religion as source vs. answer of violence.  
 
First, speaking of novelty vs. continuity, the literature describes the rise of FoRB as driven 
by different trends. It is frequently presented as part of the global ‘third wave’ of 
democratisation since the mid-1970s.8 Other scholars analyse it as an outcome of 
secularisation, the de-privatisation of religion requesting more frequent interventions 
                                                 
5 Ibid., p. 947. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Shakman Hurd, Elizabeth, Beyond Religious Freedom: The New Global Politics of Religion, 
Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2015. 
8 Witte, John and Green, Christian, “Religious Freedom, Democracy and International Human 
Rights”, in Timothy Shah, Alfred Stepan and Monica Duffy Toft (eds), Rethinking Religion and 
World Affairs, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012, pp. 105-128. 
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by public authorities to regulate it in the public sphere. Cultural pluralisation of societies 
also plays its part by multiplying frictions between spiritual traditions and fueling 
reactions of cultural defence, especially regarding Islam. Laws on FoRB may be used 
by minority denominations to claim recognition, but also by majority faiths to defend 
their status to the detriment of smaller spiritual groups.9 Freedom of religion is thus 
presented both as a consequence of societal decline of religion and differentiation 
between politics and religion and as a channel for the revival of religion into politics. 
Second, referring to universalism vs. cultural singularity, freedom of religion is hailed as 
a co-product of many religious and philosophical heritages that can work as a 
transcultural language.10 Meanwhile, every denomination is prompt to claim the 
credit to have authored the notion of freedom.11 Third, when it comes to the state as 
a solution vs. as a problem, the existence of a constitutional state that respects human 
rights and the separation of spiritual and secular affairs is a precondition for FoRB. But 
public authorities are frequently also the first threat.12 Fourth, concerning power games 
vs. ideational incentives, freedom of religion is far from an immutable and neutral 
doctrine. Its framing is heavily dependent on the historical context. Its contemporary 
enunciation reflects the background of the Cold War, when Western countries 
promoted individual rights to oppose the collectivist version of freedom favoured by 
atheistic communist countries.13 The resurgence of FoRB derives largely from US efforts 
to assert its global leadership and to disseminate a worldview congruent with its 
interests.14 Fifth, concerning the shifting boundary between internal vs. external affairs, 
the notion of FoRB has been far from consensual in domestic American history15. There 
is a danger of duplicating abroad the cultural wars raging in American society and of 
                                                 
9 Ferrari, Alessandro, “Religious Freedom and the Public-Private Divide: A Broken Promise in 
Europe”, in Silvio Ferrari and Sabrina Pastorelli (eds), Religion in Public Spaces: A European 
Perspective, Farnham, Ashgate, 2012, pp. 71-91. 
10 Bucar, Elizabeth and Barnett, Barbra (eds), Does Human Rights Need God?, Grand Rapids, 
MI, Eerdmans, 2005. 
11 Shah, Timothy and Hertzke, Allen (eds), Christianity and Freedom, Vol: 1. Historical 
Perspectives, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2016; Shah, Timothy and Hertzke, Allen 
(eds), Christianity and Freedom, Vol: 2. Contemporary Perspectives, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2016. 
12 Starck, Christian, “The development of the idea of religious freedom in modern times”, in Silvio 
Ferrari and Rinaldo Cristofori (eds), Freedom of Religion and Belief, Farnham, Ashgate, 2013, 
pp. 3-17. 
13 Boyle, Kevin, “Freedom of religion in international law”, in Silvio Ferrari and Rinaldo Cristofori 
(eds), Freedom of Religion and Belief, Farnham, Ashgate, 2013, pp. 73-101. 
14 Su, Anna, Exporting Freedom: Religious Liberty and American Power, Cambridge, MA, 
Harvard University Press, 2016. 
15 Smith, Steven, The Rise and Decline of American Religious Freedom, Cambridge, MA, 
Harvard University Press, 2016. 
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repeating the “tragedy of religious freedom”16 worldwide. Finally, with regard to the 
link between religion and violence, some advocate the attacks against religious 
freedom as the source of rebellion by those who see their rights denied, and its re-
establishment as key to social pacification. Others denounce the perverse effects of 
laws or politics that define conflicts in religious terms and harden cleavages, and 
sometimes create problems out of nothing when cultural diversity was particularly 
regulated by social practices.17  
 
Overall, the way the EEAS deals with religion and more particularly with FoRB reflects 
these debates and tensions.  
 
The progressive emergence of a European diplomacy of religion 
The empirical research presented here is deliberately limited. To embrace the full 
picture of how the EU relates to religion in foreign affairs, additional aspects would 
have to be included into the analysis such as the external dimension of the dialogue 
between religious and European institutions established by Article 17 of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU); sectorial policies like development, 
humanitarian aid or culture; the action of national administrations; the global networks 
of religious civil society; and so on. Similarly, a comprehensive assessment of the 
European strategy on FoRB would demand to survey the role of the European 
Parliament; or to document the international environment constituted by the Council 
of Europe, the Organisation for Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE) or the 
United Nations Human Rights Council. The objective is here not to give an exhaustive 
account of these issues but to focus on a restricted sample. 
  
To do this, it is possible to proceed in two steps: the first is to study the framing of religion 
by the EU’s diplomacy to see whether it is conceived as an issue to deal with willy-nilly 
or as a positive factor likely to improve global governance and/or to serve European 
interests and ideals. The second step is to assess the EEAS’ actions in the light of the six 
key dichotomies discussed in the previous section. 
 
                                                 
16 DeGirolami, Mark, The Tragedy of Religious Freedom, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University 
Press, 2013. 
17 Shani, Giorgio, Religion, Identity and Human Security, London, Routledge, 2014. 
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How and why religion and FoRB became a policy object for the EEAS 
The reasons pushing the EEAS to become a political player on religious issues may 
illustrate a pragmatic approach (religion has to be dealt with because it is more and 
more on the agenda) or a normative one (religion is seen as an ethical source able to 
inspire European action in terms of efficiency, justice or democracy). 
 
A pragmatic approach can be observed as the EEAS started to develop an expertise 
on religion by necessity and opportunity. My hypothesis is twofold: first, that religion has 
imposed itself as a pressing matter on the external agenda of the EU; and, second, 
that it has presented both opportunities and constraints to an EEAS that was still in the 
process of development. European diplomats come reluctantly to terms with highly 
controversial religious subjects that contradict their risk-averse professional culture. 
Meanwhile, they also take advantage of it to frame themselves as facilitators within 
the limits set by their legal and political resources. Overall, the practice of European 
diplomacy regarding religion does not differ much from the model offered by 
international institutions and EU member states. At the global, supranational and 
national levels, religion as a subject of foreign policy complies with the usual rules of 
diplomatic compromise, bureaucratic rationality and neutrality. The tendency is to 
treat it through the legal repertoire of human rights and to reduce it to religious 
freedom, which may diminish but does not eradicate conflicts between competing 
interpretations of basic principles. 
 
Tackling religion ‘because it is out here’ 
Religion arrived early on the agenda of the institutionalising European diplomatic 
service. As a relatively new subject in foreign policy, religion has not become fixed in 
a path dependency firmly establishing the distribution and codification of roles. It is 
nevertheless directly related to national cultures, traditional arrangements between 
churches and states, imperial histories and geopolitical interests. As such, it is highly 
symbolic and controversial. The EU’s encroachment into this field has been closely 
scrutinised, all the more because it has no jurisdiction over the definition and 
management of religious issues. According to the Article 17 TFEU, the Union respects 
and does not prejudice the status under national law of churches and religious 
associations or communities in the member states. Extended to foreign affairs, this 
means that European diplomacy in matters of religion is heavily framed by the nature 
of the state as a role model, a partner and an interlocutor. 
François Foret 
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The EU is much more a follower than a leader in the global emergence of a diplomacy 
of religion. European institutions had received frequent invitations to contribute to 
international conferences on religion and lacked suitable staff to frame a response. 
The UN and the US have long acknowledged the importance of religious issues and of 
faith-based organisations. Since the 1990s, several EU member states have been 
exploring ways to deal with religion in their own diplomatic practice. The first attempts 
to develop expertise originated from individuals occupying various positions in 
national administrations. These persons constituted a ’like-minded group’ that greatly 
helped in creating common practices. Some of them moved later to the EEAS where 
they elaborated supranational practices.18 Despite these advances, religion remains 
“an exotic and esoteric business at best”, to quote a Brussels diplomat.19 
 
The impossibility of a normatively driven policy 
Is there no trace of advocacy for the positive role of religion in the genesis of the EEAS’ 
policy? The best answer is given by Pierre Vimont who was the executive secretary-
general of the EEAS between 2010 and 2015. Vimont describes how religion is 
perceived as a ‘quasi outcome’ of human rights policy.20 It had emerged before 
through other European competencies (trade, development, humanitarian aid), but 
member states draw strict red lines to limit initiatives of European institutions on the 
topic.21 The focus on FoRB is partly a consequence of this assignation to the legal 
repertoire. Notwithstanding the reluctance of member states to a strengthening of the 
EEAS, their diversity of spiritual and philosophical heritages is also an obstacle. 
Frequently, European diplomats struggle to define a normative common position likely 
to be consensual enough to be promoted actively, or at least cannot do that quickly 
and clearly enough to act in due time. 
 
Besides these structural constraints, the EEAS is also wary of denominational or 
ethnocentric biases. Some right-wing MEPs and non-governmental organisations 
                                                 
18 Bilde, Merete, “Religion and Foreign Policy: A Brussels Perspective”, in Transatlantic Academy 
(ed.), Faith, Freedom and Foreign Policy: Challenges for the Transatlantic Community, 
Washington, Transatlantic Academy, 2015, pp. 156-160. 
19 Mandaville, Peter and Silvestri, Sara, “Integrating Religious Engagement into Diplomacy: 
Challenges & Opportunities”, Issues in Governance Studies, vol. / no. ??? 67, 2015, pp. 1-13. 
20 Vimont, Pierre, 'Religion et droits de l'homme: une perspective européenne', in Denis Lacorne, 
Justin Vaïsse and Jean-Paul Willaime (dir.), La diplomatie au défi des religions, Paris, Odile 
Jacob, 2014, pp. 329-335. 
21 Ibid., pp. 329-330. 
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(NGOs) are keen to endow the EU with the responsibility of protecting Christian 
minorities worldwide. However, this would expose the bloc to accusations of 
privileging one denomination over others. Besides, Christian populations on the 
ground are frequently afraid of being singularised on a denominational basis and 
defended by a foreign power, as this creates risks for them of being accused of 
disloyalty to their own government.22 Another danger for the EU’s diplomacy is to 
appear as advancing a Western version of modernity, limiting faith to the private 
sphere, which is not congruent with the realities of other parts of the world. The 
attempts to promote the ‘European way’ of accommodating religion therefore have 
to be very cautious and flexible.23 All these reasons explain why religion cannot work 
as an explicit ethical source or cause for EU diplomacy. It is at best an instrumental 
resource oscillating constantly between symbolic and pragmatic policy. The political 
genesis and institutional management of European Guidelines on FoRB illustrate the 
submission of religion to the usual rules of European policy-making. 
 
Religion through FoRB as a means rather than an end for the EEAS 
The European effort to formalise and disseminate a position on FoRB must reconcile 
contradictory requirements: compliance with the framing of FoRB by international 
institutions and affirmation of European singularity; respect for national diversity and 
display of European unity; advocacy for human rights and accommodation with local 
interests and sensibilities. These tensions are best illustrated by the production in 2013 
of a ‘doctrine’ expressed through the EU Guidelines on the Promotion and Protection 
of Freedom of Religion or Belief. 
 
The Guidelines are a non-binding document intended to better explain EU institutions 
and policies relating to religion. They refer to the legal basis of the policy and offer 
advice to interested parties on the best way to address existing norms and 
approaches. One purpose of EUFoRB was to give practical and publicly available 
instructions to EU diplomats on the ground; another was that it should embody 
European unity as regards major principles. To search for the widest possible 
consensus, religious and philosophical groups were consulted as well as MEPs and 
experts in and outside of Europe. A number of key points emerged from these 
deliberations. Linking FoRB to other rights was not only a reassertion of the indivisibility 
                                                 
22 Ibid., p. 331. 
23 Ibid., p. 333. 
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of human rights, but also a way to merge religious issues with less controversial 
questions. Diplomats warned against two main dangers. First, endangered religious 
groups abroad should not be addressed as victims, but as citizens voicing legitimate 
claims. Meanwhile, the EU should also respect local authorities and avoid giving the 
impression of intruding into domestic affairs. Second, the EU should have a consistent 
and balanced discourse without double standards, and not criticise matters in some 
of its member states that are tolerated in others. 
 
EUFoRB’s reception was predominantly positive. Regarding civil society, both religious 
and philosophical lobbies had reasons for rejoicing and for regret. For Christian groups, 
the very existence of the Guidelines represented a success in that they recognised the 
significance of religion. However, their claims were not entirely satisfied. The EU is 
defined as impartial and not aligned to any belief or religion – in contrast with the state 
religion or privileges granted to majority denominations in some member states. 
Conscientious objection is limited to military service and does not apply to health 
services. Nonetheless, as much is left to implementation and to member states, well-
established religious groups were sure of continuing to be heard by national 
authorities. Secularist organisations resented the existence of the Guidelines as an 
illegitimate autonomisation of FoRB from other human rights. They lobbied for an 
emphasis on freedom of non-religion. They also deplored the fact that the 
recommendation that blasphemy offenses be decriminalised in third countries was not 
explicitly targeted in the existing legislation of some member states. Such a matter 
was, however, not within the scope of a foreign policy document. Overall, trade-offs 
and subsequent conflicts were left to the level of practice. Caution and silence (for 
example regarding the absence of formal definitions of religion) leave ample room for 
uncertainty. 
 
European diplomacy on the ground accommodating religion in a secular way 
Considering the example of EUFoRB, there is no evidence of rupture between 
European diplomacy and past practices of EU member states. The implementation of 
the Guidelines is not homogenous and varies according to the region of the world, the 
status of the third country and the interests at stake. The state is confirmed as the main 
actor in the handling of religion, be it a protector of or a threat to religious freedom. 
Law may be the only legitimate repertoire to deal with religion but politics prevails in 
practice and there are constant interactions and occasional tensions between how 
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religion is dealt with in domestic and external affairs. Finally, the association of religion 
with violence is stronger than ever.  
 
The EEAS, an addition to but not a major transformation of national diplomacies of 
religion 
European practices of dealing with religion reproduce largely pre-existing policy 
trends in national diplomacies. The reception of EUFoRB in the EU member states 
illustrates this continuity. The attitudes towards the Guidelines oscillate between lip 
service and ignorance. There are significant differences between those countries that 
do not know the existence of the Guidelines, those that ignore it intentionally and 
those that acknowledge it as a useful clarification of European doctrine or as a 
straightforward reminder of human rights. Some are keen to mark their attention and 
to implement the document proactively. Austria claims to have been a driving force 
in the drafting of EUFoRB on behalf of its tradition of intercultural dialogue (e-mail 
interview 1). Greece forcefully situates its diplomatic action on FoRB under the 
European aegis (e-mail interview 2). Other small or medium-sized countries that have 
developed a specific diplomacy on religion describe a dual approach, balancing 
loyalty to multi-level European action with independent initiatives. This is the case for 
Finland (e-mail interview 3) and the Netherlands (e-mail interview 4). Larger states are 
more likely to ignore European Guidelines on FoRB, as they ignore the EEAS in general. 
Germany balances initiatives aimed at improving EU action (with criticism of its 
slowness and high degree of abstraction) with leadership aiming for direct influence 
in UN spheres, where one of its nationals (Heiner Bielefeldt, UN Special Rapporteur on 
FoRB) plays a key role (e-mail interview 5). French and British diplomacy, anchored in 
centuries of worldwide influence, are reluctant to support an autonomous EU foreign 
policy. To put things bluntly, the bigger the states, the bigger the stakes; and the more 
prestigious the context, the more limited the level of Europeanisation. As stated by a 
senior French diplomat in Washington: “The European dimension works well in 
countries where it is difficult. In Washington, when you are France, you do not need 
Europe” (Interview 4). Countries that are big diplomatic players have also a propensity 
to consider religion from a more political standpoint to tackle all the implications that 
FoRB cannot encompass. As a British diplomat emphasises, “officially it is human rights, 
but it is more than that. As a consequence of extremism, Islamic State, questions are: 
how do we understand religion better?” (e-mail interview 6). Europe is only a part of 
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the new policy context, not a driving transformative force of a new diplomacy of 
religion. 
 
Pragmatism vs universalism: European FoRB diplomacy adapted to contexts 
European diplomats’ autonomy and agency depend on the stakes and on 
geography. They may have greater margins of initiative in a small African state of little 
strategic interest than in Washington, where every member state has its own agenda. 
Larger countries are more inclined to keep their cards close to their chest in political 
hotspots or in their traditional zones of influence. For smaller powers and those without 
strong diplomatic traditions, it makes sense to delegate complex matters to the 
European level, where expertise can be provided. The status of religion depends on a 
policy mix determined by the context and the issues. In places where major economic 
or security problems are pressing, spiritual affairs are less likely to emerge (unless they 
are part of the security problem). The more powerful the interlocutors, the less the EU 
may wish to upset them with human rights questions.  
 
Russia offers an example of a dual European strategy: occasional partnership with 
religious civil society to defend human rights, but also to find indirect access to the 
ruling class. The EU Delegation in Moscow meets minority denominational 
organisations only with caution in order to avoid making them look like ‘foreign 
agents’. Meanwhile, interactions with the powerful Russian Orthodox Church are 
instrumental in opening channels of communication with political authorities. 
Exchanges with religious NGOs are calculated to seek information and influence 
without causing offense. In Singapore, a country promoting ‘secularism with a soul’, 
the EU Delegation discretely monitors cases involving FoRB such as when an individual 
is taken to court for speaking out against a religion, thus creating in local terms ‘racial 
and religious disharmony’. Another configuration is when denominational cleavages 
coincide with other divisions. In Belarus, religious freedom is a casus belli between the 
Orthodox majority population and the Catholic Polish minority. Hence, the EU 
Delegation in Minsk is extra careful to deal with religious matters. In Rwanda, European 
diplomats consider that FoRB is guaranteed by the constitution and is generally 
respected by the authorities. However, as the country is still deeply marked by 
genocide and ethnic divisions, meeting with religious groups is a priority in order to 
prevent further crises. These examples show how FoRB is always implemented in 
function of the specificities of each situation.  
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A preference to act with and through the states 
EU Delegations are the local voice of the Union in their host country. Three types of 
actions are commonly described, more or less in order of frequency and predilection: 
putting an issue on the agenda of regular meetings with national authorities; joint 
political initiatives with the national diplomatic services of member states; press 
releases and public statements. Diplomats prioritise the routinised dialogue with their 
local peers to express discontent or concern. When the gravity of the situation requires 
an ad hoc move, this is preferably made in coordination with the national diplomacies 
of member states, or with other international bodies (such as UN agencies). The 
strategy of final resort, publicly voicing disapproval, is a ‘nuclear option’, mostly used 
when the local authorities are unreliable partners, either because the state is failing or 
is authoritarian. 
 
The prevalence of the state as driving force in the handling of religious issues is verified 
also regarding the limits assigned by member states to the EEAS. EU Delegations 
organise periodical meetings with national embassies and religion may crop up 
incidentally in the debate but there is no political discussion per se (Interview 4) for 
three reasons: a consensus on general principles; a focus on means rather than on 
ends; a distrust towards the lack of ‘political capacity’ of the EEAS. First, the idea that 
“there is not much discussion because basically it is not necessary to talk about 
something you agree upon” (Interview 5) is a recurrent leitmotiv. Next, diplomats prefer 
to deal with the ‘how’ rather than with the ‘what’, emphasising that religion is treated 
as business as usual: “Discussions deal with procedures for working together, on 
reaching considered decisions, using a bureaucratic approach such as we have with 
our own ministry of foreign affairs. There is little discussion on matters of substance, on 
major principles” (Interview 6). Finally, national diplomats are concerned by the EU 
Delegations’ lack of reliability and reactivity. European officials are considered to be 
short of the political sense required to handle controversial subjects such as religion. 
Besides, they have to voice a ‘European line’ that takes such a long time to forge that 
it is impossible to move with the urgency imposed by a crisis. And when religion comes 
to the forefront, it is usually in a crisis context.  
 
In comparison, the US State Department takes a slightly more positive view of its 
relationship with the EEAS as regards religion. There is a preference to deal directly with 
national diplomacies, but the European channel may be a catalyst. As stated by 
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American diplomats (Interview 7), “the EU has the ability to shape the conversation 
and to force member states to take some issues into account”. In short, the main 
interest of European diplomacy is to reach out to national powers.  
 
A constant combination between principles and pragmatism 
As an action repertoire, law offers the advantage of respecting EU institutional 
principles and practices by channeling religion through the competences of each 
institution. However, it does not suppress the divergences in the interpretations of 
fundamental norms stemming from different national cultures and interests. 
Politicisation of the management of religion is unavoidable when European diplomats 
have to face conflictual situations. EEAS practice consists of a back-and-forth 
movement between legal and political repertoires in the search for a fragile 
equilibrium. 
 
For a diplomat dealing with religion, the legal approach offers many advantages. It is 
legitimate since the rule of law is the founding justification and the ultimate purpose 
of a democratic state. Law entails a presumption of objectivity and releases the agent 
from any personal accountability. It is held to be clear and capable of resolving any 
doubt by reference to a ‘pyramid of authority’. Yet, when putting policy into practice, 
the picture is far more troubled. European diplomats testify that there are no clear-cut 
instructions that might inform a homogenous modus operandi on religion. Recurrent 
topics emerge: pragmatism and its limits; sincerity; the gap between guidelines 
defined in Brussels and the flexibility required to comply with foreign contexts. Bringing 
together religious leaders to discuss religious freedom and appear on a photograph 
may be an end in itself for a Brussels headquarters checking boxes such as ‘dialogue 
with civil society’ and ‘promotion of human rights’. However, in their regular 
exchanges with local actors, those staffing EU Delegations and offices have to 
demonstrate the sense and continuity of European political action in order to maintain 
their credibility and audience. Pragmatism may also consist of adapting the law in 
order to avoid offending local sensibilities and initiating conflicts. Sometimes, there is 
a tacit agreement not to inform the headquarters extensively regarding arrangements 
that are stretching the official policy lines, leaving the actors on the field with more 
freedom but also more responsibility if things go the wrong way.  
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The association of religion with violence 
The treatment of religion predominantly through the prism of FoRB may have perverse 
effects well emphasised by the literature. Where and when there is no FoRB issue, 
religion is not an object of diplomatic interest. Only a violation of rights will attract 
attention to it. As a consequence, religion becomes invisible in Western-style 
democracies. By contrast, it is overemphasised in countries where FoRB is endangered. 
This may lead to exacerbating the opposition between a secularised safe Western 
world and a religious and dangerous rest of the world. This kind of opposition appears 
even more frequently when the EU deals with Muslim societies. Framing a geopolitical 
situation in terms of FoRB may also serve to conceal embarrassing issues. The Arab 
Spring uprisings were motivated by economic crises and calls for democratisation and 
dignity, but had a limited religious dimension from the outset. Western countries were 
nevertheless keen to interpret these social movements as a quest for religious freedom 
congruent with the European liberal model. This was a way to downgrade social 
claims and prevent any connection with protests contesting European economic 
policies such as the ‘Occupy’ and ‘Indignados’ movements.24 FoRB may then 
contribute towards political diversions and containment of external challenges.  
 
Responses to the survey of EU Delegations show how they adjust advocacy for religious 
freedom according to the level of insecurity. In situations of endemic violence, where 
no authority is able to impose the rule of law, FoRB is helpless. Therefore, the EU strategy 
is a constant search for a policy mix between security and human development, the 
latter encompassing human rights, including those related to religion. As an example, 
the EU Delegation in Tunisia balances in its reports to Brussels the democratic progress 
achieved on religious freedom and the fears inspired by religious terrorism. In contrast, 
faced by extreme religious violence such as in Niger due to Boko Haram and jihadists 
from Mali, the discourse of human rights is powerless. Realpolitik may lead to 
collaboration against terrorism with governments that are themselves threats to FoRB. 
In Kazakhstan, European diplomats criticised the prohibition of Jehovah’s Witnesses 
publications by the same authorities with whom they collaborate to prevent Islamic 
radicalisation. Violence is a trigger to take the religious factor into account, with the 
risk of exaggerating its causality. It is also a reason to minimise it in terms of religious 
                                                 
24 Hyvönen, Ari-Elmeri, 'From Event to Process: The EU and the 'Arab Spring'', in Donatella Della 
Porta and Alice Mattoni (eds), Spreading Protest: Social Movements in Times of Crisis, 
Colchester, ECPR Press, 2014, pp. 91-116. 
François Foret 
19 
freedom if European interests demand it. The link between the level of violence and 
religion is thus multidimensional and not unidirectional.  
 
In the future, more of the same? 
Four years after the adoption of EUFoRB, what are the prospects? No substantial 
change in policy practices is discernible. FoRB has lost some of its gloss on the global 
level. Canada, a pioneer on the topic, closed its Office of Religious Freedom in March 
2016.25 The issue is still an axis of American foreign policy but it is increasingly criticised 
and the emphasis is instead put on the engagement of religious actors. The threat of 
religious terrorism reinforces the prioritisation of security over freedom. Against this 
background, the EU has routinely reasserted its commitment to promote ForB as part 
of its global human rights diplomacy.26 A recent unexpected development has, 
however, been the creation by the President of the Commission of the position of 
Special Envoy for the Promotion of Freedom of Religion or Belief outside the European 
Union.27 This act came as a surprise to all, inside and outside the EEAS. In terms of policy 
doctrine, mandating a specific official on FoRB is not congruent with the usual EU line 
of considering human rights to be indivisible. It is more in tune with the long-standing 
US invitation to the EU to establish a high-profile agent with specific responsibility for 
religious freedom.28 It duplicates similar positions that exist in international organisations 
such as the OSCE or the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. 
 
The details of the establishment of the post of Special Envoy are significant. The 
announcement of the appointment of the first incumbent, Ján Figeľ, was made at the 
Vatican on 6 May 2016, on the occasion of the award of the Charlemagne Prize to 
Pope Francis. This casts a Catholic shadow on the new institutional role. Its place in the 
European bureaucratic constellation is also telling. The Special Envoy does not report 
                                                 
25 Lee, Morgan, “Canada Thinks It Has a Better Way to Defend Religious Freedom”, Christianity 
Today, 4 June 2016, http://www.christianitytoday.com/gleanings/2016/april/canada-closes-
office-religious-freedom-orf-andrew-bennett.html (accessed 12 May 2017). 
26 European Commission, “Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy 2015 – 2019”, 20 July 
2015, p. 12, https://ec.europa.eu/anti-trafficking/sites/antitrafficking/files/action-plan-on-
human-rights-and-democracy-2015-2019_en.pdf (accessed 12 May 2017); EEAS, “EU 
Guidelines on the Promotion and Protection of Freedom of Religion or Belief – Implementation”, 
internal document, July 2016. 
27 European Commission, “President Juncker appoints the first Special Envoy for the promotion 
of freedom of religion or belief outside the European Union”, Press Release, 6 May 2016, 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-1670_en.htm, (accessed 12 May 2017). 
28 Thames, Knox, “Making freedom of religion or belief a true EU priority”, Florence, EUI, 2012, 
http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/23357 (accessed 12 May 2017). 
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to the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 
but instead serves as Special Adviser to the Commissioner for International 
Cooperation and Development. The mandate of Figeľ, defined months after his entry 
into function, sketches a profile of go-between and interinstitutional player. A focus is 
put on action against radicalisation in third countries. In geographic terms, the 
emphasis is placed on the Middle East as the most critical area regarding FoRB. The 
creation of the position of Special Envoy is presented as largely due to the threat of 
ISIS/Da'esh and the systematic mass murder of religious minorities. Other zones of 
attention are North and Sub-Saharan Africa and South and South East Asia.29 This 
thematic and geographic focus illustrates the usual link made between religion, 
violence and poverty. Finally, the Special Envoy was established for an initial mandate 
of one year, reinforcing the perception that this is an exploratory, fragile initiative. 
 
The first incumbent is the Slovak Christian Democrat Ján Figeľ, the former European 
Commissioner for Education, Training, Culture and Youth. Figel’ contributed largely 
towards building a position that he advocated within the European People’s Party and 
among top EU officials.30 He emphasised FoRB as a tool to tackle the migration crisis, 
as protecting religious minorities from persecution would keep them at home. He 
advocated also that Europe should rescue Christians at risk all around the world. The 
argument is then primarily instrumental and self-serving for Europe, and secondarily 
moral and civilisational. Figeľ’s plea is fully in tune with the securitisation of religion and 
the conception that FoRB is interlinked with violence, with a normative note asserting 
the Christian identity of Europe.  
 
From the start, Figeľ was under fire by progressive forces regarding his track record as 
a Commissioner who financed the Vatican’s World Youth Day in Cologne in 2005 
despite the opposition of the European Parliament; as a supporter of the initiative ‘One 
of Us’ aiming to prevent European funding for research likely to destroy human 
embryos, including stem cells; and as a bedfellow with conservative American 
organisations such as the Political Network of Values. Fears were that he could 
                                                 
29 European Commission, “Mandate and work plan of the Special Envoy for the promotion of 
freedom of religion or belief outside the European Union”, Brussels, 26 September 2016. 
30 TASR, “Figeľ becomes EU’s special envoy for freedom of religion”, 9 May 2016, 
http://spectator.sme.sk/c/20159054/figel-becomes-eus-special-envoy-for-freedom-of- 
religion.html (accessed 12 May 2017). 
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influence EU development policy regarding LGBT rights, gender equality, and sexual 
and reproductive matters.31 
 
Nevertheless, in April 2017, Figeľ was reappointed to another 12-month term as Special 
Envoy for the promotion of religion or belief outside the EU. This renewal was not taken 
for granted: “there has been concern in some diplomatic circles that the Special 
Envoy role, devoid of much backroom staff and based in the Berlaymont, rather than 
in the External Action Service, was too reliant on ‘soft power’ and Figeľ’s own 
charisma.”32 Figeľ has indeed traveled widely and structured the communication 
around his personal meetings with religious dignitaries, visits in the field in developing 
countries and interventions at conferences.33 The symbolic function of FoRB as a cause 
allowing to display European unity and principles gives crucial importance to public 
relations. The mandate attributed to Figeľ in September 2016 mentioned four 
deliverables that all relate to a communicative dimension:  
reinforced and visible EU action on FoRB (…); stronger dialogue with religious or 
belief communities, civil society and other relevant stakeholders; a stronger EU 
voice and presence in international processes and initiatives on FoRB (…); 
increased visibility of EU engagement in FoRB through appropriate 
communication.34  
 
The extent to which the challenge of raising the public profile of the issue and of the 
EU has been met is difficult to assess regarding the short span of time. Once again, the 
tools to do so range in the usual communicative resources of European institutions: 
conferences, networking, distinctions. An example is the creation in 2017 of an 
additional category in the Lorenzo Natali Media Prize, organised by the European 
Commission’s Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development 
since 1992 and awarded to amateur and professional journalists for outstanding 
reporting on development and poverty eradication. This extra distinction targets 
outstanding reporting on freedom of religion or belief outside the EU.35 
                                                 
31 The European Parliamentary Forum on Population and Development, “Opponent of gender 
and women’s human rights appointed EU Special Envoy”, Intelligence Brief, no. 13, June 2016. 
32 Tempest, Matthew, “Figel reappointed as EU Special Envoy on religious freedom”, 
Euractiv.com,12 April 2017. 
33 https://twitter.com/janfigel?lang=fr 
34 European Commission, “Mandate and work plan of the Special Envoy for the promotion of 
freedom of religion or belief outside the European Union”, Brussels, 26 September 2016. 
35 European Commission, “Lorenzo Natali Media Prize 2017”, Brussels, 
https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/lnp_en (accessed 12 May 2017). 
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It is worth noticing that the reappointment of Figeľ was largely commented in relation 
with internal as much as external political events, especially recent decisions by the 
Court of Justice of the EU regarding the possibility for employers to ban their workers 
from wearing religious or political symbols at work or the rise of distrust and 
discriminations towards Muslims in European societies. It illustrates that foreign affairs 
are still commanded by domestic politics.  
 
Conclusion 
This paper aimed to understand the reasons and modalities of the action of the EEAS 
towards religion through the prism of FoRB. The research question was to assess the 
salience and distinctiveness of religion as a policy object in foreign affairs. A first 
hypothesis was that the European diplomatic strategy on religion is the reflection of 
the resurgence of faith at a global stage due to geopolitical and societal 
transformations. This hypothesis is partly verified as European initiatives on religion are 
externally driven by traumatic events, security threats and mimetism with other large 
powers and international institutions. However, the EU’s policy is also in its modalities 
the outcome of the secularisation that singles out Europe compared to the rest of the 
world. 
 
A second hypothesis was that the purpose of the EEAS’ mobilisation on religious issues 
is both to assert itself regarding other European institutions and to reinforce the profile 
of the EU in international relations. This hypothesis is confirmed by our research within 
the strict limits set to European diplomats by their competences and political 
resources. As a relatively new entity, the EEAS has with FoRB found a cause to uphold, 
a cause that is consensual and symbolic enough to offer the opportunity for a 
statement of European unity and ideals. The added value of this policy remains, 
however, modest in terms of legitimisation and agency both for the EEAS and for the 
EU. 
 
A third and last hypothesis was that religion and FoRB are ‘business as usual’ for the EU: 
ideational incentives (advocacy for FoRB, display of European unity and identity) 
matter but are secondary to realist ones (interests and security concerns); the risk-
averse culture of diplomats and European bureaucracies leads them to defer to the 
states and to prioritize a legal approach of religion. This hypothesis is fully verified. The 
EEAS pays high attention to work in full agreement with member states to voice 
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European positions. It is also extra careful regarding public activities and interactions 
with civil society that could be perceived as controversial interferences in third states’ 
affairs. Religion is handled as a security issue, religious freedom being the key to 
prevent or solve conflicts. It is reduced as much as possible to the repertoire of human 
rights, interpreted with flexibility to comply with local particularisms. In short, European 
diplomacy displays, in a hybridised version and with less political audacity, the 
practices of member states. Religion as an object of foreign affairs does not move 
much the usual policy lines and is most frequently encompassed in larger and more 
pressing issues. 
 
  
EU Diplomacy Paper 7/2017 
 24 
Annex 
An online survey was developed with the support of the EEAS headquarters and sent 
to all 139 EU Delegations around the world. 38 responses were elicited between June 
and August 2015. This covers the following countries (in inverse chronological order of 
response, since some Delegations cover several countries): Russia; Uruguay; 
Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Panama; Benin; Belarus; Trinidad and Tobago; Nepal; 
Colombia; Rwanda; Singapore; Kazakhstan; Djibouti; Mauritania; Tunisia; South and 
North Korea; Canada; Niger; Chile; India and Bhutan; Cambodia; Bosnia; Georgia; 
Timor; Zambia; Serbia; Ethiopia; Switzerland and Liechtenstein; Gambia; Nigeria; Haiti; 
Equator; Mozambique; Zimbabwe; Botswana and Southern African Development 
Community; US; Iceland; Brazil. 
In addition, interviews were carried out between 2013 and 2016 with European and 
national diplomats posted in the field and at headquarters. This analysis is part of a 
broader research framework also including a survey of national diplomacies of EU 
member states and transnational interactions.  
 
Interviews 
The anonymity (name, function) was required by a large number of the interviewees. 
Face-to-face interviews 
1. Interview with two EEAS officials, EU Delegation, Washington, 17/4/2015. 
2. Interview with one official, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Paris, 23/2/2016. 
3. Interview with four EEAS officials, Tokyo, 5/11/2015. 
4. Interview with two French officials, Washington, 17/4/2005. 
5. Interview with a Belgian official, Washington, 17/4/2015. 
6. Interview with a German official, Washington, 17/4/2015. 
7. Group interview with members of the Office of Religion and Global Affairs and other 
services, State Department, Washington, 13/4/2015. 
 
Interviews by e-mail 
1. E-mail interview with an Austrian official. 
2. E-mail interview with a Greek official. 
3. E-mail interview with a Finnish official. 
4. E-mail interview with a Dutch official. 
5. E-mail interview with a German official. 
6. E-mail interview with a British official  
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